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This paper develops a model where income inequality and intergenerational mo-
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11 Introduction
The extent to which economic status passes from one generation to the next is a mea-
sure of intergenerational mobility. Mobility aﬀects income inequality within a generation
through changes in the economic status of each agent. In turn, income inequality aﬀects
intergenerational mobility through changes in the incentive to invest in education. There-
fore, there is a mutual link between inequality and mobility within and across generations
(Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira, 2007).
Earlier studies have attempted to derive the correlation between inequality and mobil-
ity in the presence of ﬁnancial constraints (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Owen and Weil,
1998; Maoz and Moav, 1999). In these models, the constraint creates a kind of pecuniary
increasing return that results in multiple equilibria, one characterized by low mobility
and high inequality, and the other by high mobility and low inequality. These models
also indicate a negative correlation between inequality and mobility, as shown by Davies,
Zhang and Zeng (2005), who examine the role of education systems in the determination
of inequality and mobility.
[Figure 1 about here.]
However, some empirical evidence shows that the negative correlation appears less
than exact (Solon, 2002). As shown in Figure 1, a negative correlation is found in some
OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries with low
mobility and high inequality, including Italy, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States (US), while Nordic countries are characterized by high mobility and low inequality.
However, despite considerable intergenerational mobility in Australia and Canada, these
countries also score relatively highly on measures of cross-sectional inequality (Corak,
2006; D’Addio, 2007). This mixed evidence suggests that there is a need to develop
a theory that fully explains the correlation between inequality and mobility in OECD
countries.
To our knowledge, few papers discuss these cross-country diﬀerences. An exception
is Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007), who demonstrate two opposing eﬀects: the
ﬁrst eﬀect is via the education sector, which produces the negative correlation; and the
second eﬀect is via the production sector, which creates the positive correlation. We can
use these opposing eﬀects to demonstrate the properties of inequality and mobility in the
above-mentioned OECD countries.1
1The eﬀects of changes in the production and education sectors in Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira
(2007) are as follows. Changes in the production sector, such as skill-biased technological changes, aﬀect
the return to factors of production and thus impact on inequality between the skilled and the unskilled.
Increased inequality implies an incentive for the gains from education and thus strengthens the incentive
2Although Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007) contribute to explaining cross-
country diﬀerences in inequality and mobility, the following two issues remain unresolved.
First, the link between inequality and mobility via redistributive politics, which is an
important policy issue in many OECD countries, is not included in their model. Second,
they measure inequality with the wage gap rather than the Gini coeﬃcient (which is af-
fected by redistribution). Therefore, the question arises as to how inequality and mobility
are determined via redistributive politics within and across generations when inequality is
measured by the Gini coeﬃcient in terms of after-tax-and-transfer income. The purpose
of the current paper is to present a model that responds to this challenge.2
For the purpose of our analysis, we employ the political economy redistribution model
in Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007). We extend this model by introducing in-
tergenerational mobility whereby poor-born agents have a chance of becoming rich via
educational investment, and rich-born agents have a risk of becoming poor if they fail in
education. Furthermore, although poor-born agents have some opportunity for upward
mobility, they have disadvantages in terms of opportunities and the costs of education
relative to rich-born agents. When greater accessibility is ensured for poor-born agents,
the economy attains higher mobility and lower inequality. The parameter representing
accessibility of education is the ﬁrst key factor that accounts for cross-country diﬀerences
in inequality and mobility.
The second key factor is the multiple self-fulﬁlling expectations of agents (Hassler,
Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2007). In undertaking educational investment, young agents
have expectations of redistributive policies in their old age. When young agents hold the
expectation of greater redistribution, it provides a disincentive to engage in educational
investment, thereby resulting in a lower proportion of the rich. This implies a greater
number of low-income young individuals, which in turn increases future demand for re-
distribution. The opposite mechanism applies when young agents have the expectation
of lower redistribution in old age. Therefore, the economy may attain multiple equilibria,
including a rich-majority and a poor-majority equilibrium. The outcome depends on the
to invest in education, which increases mobility. By contrast, changes in the education sector increase
access to education and thus increase mobility. This reduces the number of poor, unskilled workers,
which reduces inequality. Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007) show that when the education sector
eﬀect is larger (smaller) than the production sector eﬀect, the economy displays a negative (positive)
correlation between inequality and mobility.
2In addition to Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007), Bernasconi and Profeta (2007) and Ichino,
Karabarbounis and Moretti (2009) undertake analyses of intergenerational mobility and inequality. How-
ever, Bernasconi and Profeta (2007) focus on the dynamic motion of intergenerational mobility, and there
is no consideration of cross-country diﬀerences. By contrast, Ichino, Karabarbounis and Moretti (2009)
introduce political institutions into the Becker and Tomes (1979) framework of intergenerational mobility
and show that two societies with similar economic backgrounds may display diﬀerent levels of intergenera-
tional mobility depending on their political institutions. However, the cross-country diﬀerences in income
inequality and mobility are abstracted from their analysis; their focus is on public education rather than
income redistribution.
3expectations of agents.
We can explain the cross-country diﬀerences in inequality and mobility using these two
key factors. The ﬁrst key factor, accessibility of education, creates a negative correlation
between inequality and mobility. In the poor-majority equilibrium, greater accessibility of
education gives poor-born individuals an incentive to invest in education, thereby resulting
in higher mobility and lower inequality. This prediction ﬁts the empirical evidence of at
least some countries, where Italy, the UK and the US are low-accessibility economies, and
Nordic countries are high-accessibility economies (Sch¨ utz, Ursprung and W¨ oßmann, 2008;
OECD, 2008a)
The rich-majority equilibrium emerges when accessibility lies beyond a critical level.
That is, given greater accessibility of education, the political economy achieves multi-
ple political equilibria. The rich-majority equilibrium attains greater inequality than the
poor-majority equilibrium (representing Nordic countries) because the former features
lower redistribution as supported by the rich. However, both equilibria attain higher
mobility and lower inequality compared with the poor-majority equilibrium with low ac-
cessibility (as represented by Italy, the UK and the US). Therefore, in our model economy,
Australia and Canada can be interpreted as representing the rich-majority equilibrium.
Our analysis also contributes to the literature on multiple equilibria in inequality and
mobility (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Owen and Weil, 1998; Maoz and Moav, 1999;
Mookherjee and Napel, 2007). Extant models show that initial conditions matter for the
determination of the long-run steady state. By contrast, our paper shows that the expec-
tations of agents as well as the initial conditions matter. In particular, we demonstrate
that: (i) two economies sharing the same initial conditions could converge to diﬀerent
equilibria in the long run because the state of the economy depends on the expectations
of agents; and (ii) without any structural change, an economy at one of the equilibria may
move to the other because of changes in the expectations of agents. These results help
provide an explanation for why developed countries sharing similar backgrounds attain
diﬀerent inequality and mobility over time, and why a country experiences changes in
inequality and mobility over time, even though its economic structure has changed little.
Apart from this body of work, the current analysis also relates to the literature on in-
equality and redistributive politics (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995; Piketty, 1995; Hassler
et al., 2003; Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2007; Ono and Arawatari, 2008; Arawatari
and Ono, 2008, 2009). In these studies, the following issues are abstracted from the anal-
ysis: a mutual link between inequality and mobility (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995),
dynamic aspects of inequality and mobility (Piketty, 1995), and intergenerational mobil-
ity (Hassler et al., 2003; Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2007; Ono and Arawatari,
2008, 2009). Our previous work (Arawatari and Ono, 2008, 2009) demonstrates mobility
using the framework in Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007). However, the focus
4there is on earning mobility over the life cycle. By contrast, the current paper presents
the dynamic aspects of the correlation between intergenerational mobility and inequality
aﬀected by redistributive politics.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
focuses on some period t and provides the characterization of the period−t political equi-
librium. Section 4 characterizes the dynamic political equilibrium deﬁned as a sequence of
period−t political equilibriums. Using the characterization of political equilibrium in Sec-
tions 3 and 4, Section 5 focuses on the steady state and demonstrates how the accessibility
of education aﬀects inequality, mobility and redistribution. Section 6 provides empirical
implications of the numerical result. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The model is a two-period overlapping-generations model based on Hassler, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2007). Time is discrete and denoted by t =0 ,1,2,···. The economy consists
of a continuum of agents living for two periods, youth and old age. Each generation has
a unit mass. The main departure from the model in Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2007) is that agents are heterogeneous at birth. Some are born into poor families, while
others are born into rich families. Poor-born agents have the chance of becoming rich via
educational investment, while rich-born agents face the risk of becoming poor if they fail
in education. Therefore, there is intergenerational mobility in this economy.
Let ut denote the size of the old poor in period t. Among the young born in period t,
ut are born into poor families and 1− ut into rich families. Young agents can aﬀect their
prospects in life using educational investment. Those who are successful in education
become rich, and obtain a high wage, normalized to one, for both periods. Those who are
unsuccessful in education become poor and obtain a low wage, normalized to zero, for
both periods. Figure 2 illustrates the timing of events and the distribution of rich and
poor across the generations.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The opportunities for, and costs of, education depend on the status of the families
into which agents are born. Let er
t and e
p
t denote the probabilities of educational success
(i.e., becoming rich) for rich-born and poor-born agents, respectively. Those who are
born into rich families have full access to education and can increase the probability er
t of
remaining rich by undertaking costly investment with the cost function (er
t)2. However,
those who are born into poor families have limited access to education. With probability
1 − μ ∈ [0,1], they have no opportunity of education. With probability μ,t h e yh a v ea n
5opportunity, but the cost of education is given by γ · (e
p
t)w h e r eγ>1. This assumption
implies that the educational cost for the poor-born young is higher than for the rich-born
young. Therefore, poor-born young agents have a disadvantage in terms of opportunities
and costs.
The assumption of γ and μ is motivated by the following observations. Hassler and
Rodriguez Mora (2000) and Roemer (2004) argue that the distribution of innate and
social assets among individuals is not independent between generations and that parents
aﬀect their children’s chances for acquisition of income through innate and social heritage.
For example, rich-born children can achieve a high score with low costs thanks to their
high innate ability received from their parents. In addition, they can apply promising
strategies for success thanks to precise information given by their educated parents. In
our framework, an intergenerational heritage of innate and social assets is captured by
the parameter γ, which represents the diﬀerence in costs of education for skill acquisition.
Empirical evidence suggests that the above-mentioned family background eﬀects diﬀer
across countries (OECD, 2008). The diﬀerence comes from the variation in equality of op-
portunities related to school systems like early tracking and preschool education (Sch¨ utz,
Ursprung and W¨ oßmann, 2008). Based on the two international student achievement
tests, the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and its replication
for a partly diﬀerent set of countries (TIMSS-repeat), Sch¨ utz, Ursprung and W¨ oßmann
(2008) show that the family-background eﬀect is larger (i.e., equality of opportunity is
lower) the earlier a country tracks its students into diﬀerent school types of ability and the
shorter is the preschool education. In our framework, equality of opportunity is captured
by the parameter μ, which demonstrates the degree of accessibility to education for the
poor-born children.3






t =( 1− ut)(1 − er
t), respectively. The poor-born agents of size ut
have the opportunity of education with probability μ, and they succeed in education and
become rich with a probability of e
p
t. The rich-born agents of size 1−ut fail in education
and become poor with a probability of 1 − er




t also indicate the proportions of agents experiencing upward and
3It should be noted that the current paper abstracts from the pecuniary link between the budgetary
constraints of parents and the educational investments of children. Instead, the paper focuses on the
nonpecuniary link between parents and children in terms of education acquisition. The reason behind
the focus on the nonpecuniary link is twofold. First, the nonpecuniary link plays an important role in
determination of educational acquisition as shown by Sch¨ utz, Ursprung and W¨ oßmann (2008) and OECD
(2008a). Second, the long-run state becomes dependent on initial conditions when the pecuniary link is
introduced into the model (see, for example, Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Owen and Weil, 1998; and
Maoz and Moav, 1999). In other words, two economies sharing similar initial conditions converge to the
same equilibrium. This prediction fails to explain the variation in inequality and mobility among some
OECD countries sharing similar economic backgrounds.
6downward mobility, respectively.
There is no storage technology in this economy. Each agent uses his/her endowments
within the period. The government provides lump-sum transfers, s, ﬁnanced by taxes
levied on the rich. The tax rates are age dependent, τo for the old and τy for the young.
The tax rates are also determined before the young agents decide on their investments.
Therefore, the expected utility functions of agents alive at time t are given as follows:
V
o,r










t · (1 − τ
y
t ) − (e
r
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t denote the utility of the old rich and the old poor, and
the expected utility of the young born into rich families and the young born into poor









t are computed prior to the success or failure of individuals.




t , and a young agent born into a poor family chooses e
p
t to maximize V
y,p
t . Therefore,















































Agents with the same family background choose the same investment, implying that
the proportion of the old poor in period t +1 ,u t+1, is given by:









































Thus, the proportion of old poor (i.e., the proportion of agents who were unsuccessful in
their youth), ut+1, depends on the tax levied on the rich young agents in period t, τ
y
t ,t h e
t a xl e v i e do nt h eo l dr i c ha g e n t si np e r i o dt +1 ,τo
t+1, and the proportion of old poor, ut.
The tax revenues from rich agents are transferred to every agent in a lump-sum fashion.



































are the tax revenues ﬁnanced by the old rich and the young rich, respectively. The function











































3P e r i o d - t Political Equilibrium
This section considers the determination of redistribution policy and the distribution
of rich and poor in some period t. Section 3.1 provides the deﬁnition of a period-t
political equilibrium based on the concept of a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium
with majority voting. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 characterize the period-t political equilibrium
by focusing on the pattern of taxation and the distribution of rich and poor. The dynamic
equilibrium sequence of redistribution and the distribution of rich and poor are analyzed
in the following section.
3.1 Deﬁnition of Period-t Political Equilibrium
Following Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007), we assume that elections are held at
the end of each period and the elected politician sets tax rates for the following period.
The old have no interest in the following period’s tax rates and thus abstain from voting.
At the end of each period, the young know their wage realization in the following period.
Therefore, this assumption of voting is observationally equivalent to assuming that agents
vote over current taxes at the beginning of each period but that only the old vote (Hassler
et al., 2003; Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2007). We employ the latter interpretation
8in the following analysis.






t+1) and the government budget






















































where the term in the ﬁrst line, (1 − τo
t ), is the after-tax income of the old rich, and the
term (1/2) ·
 
W +( 1 /2) ·{ (1 − ut)+ut · (μ/γ)}·  Z
 
is the lump-sum transfer.
The present paper focuses on stationary Markov-perfect equilibria with majority vot-
ing. The proportion of old poor (ut) summarizes the state of the economy, and the identity
of a decisive voter depends on this proportion. An oﬃce-seeking politician elected by vot-
ers sets policies to maximize the utility of the larger group. Given these features, we
provide the deﬁnition of the period-t political equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 1: A period-t (stationary) Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a triplet
of functions {T o,Ty,U}, where T o :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] and T y are two public policy
rules, τo
t = T o(ut)a n dτ
y
t = T y, and U :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is a private decision rule,
ut+1 = U(τ
y
t ), such that given ut, the following functional equations hold.
1. T o(ut) = argmaxτo
t ∈[0,1] W dec(τo






W o,r ≡ (1 − τo
t )+1
2 · W(τo
t ,u t)i f ut ≤ 1/2,
W o,p ≡ 1
2 · W(τo
t ,u t)i f ut > 1/2.
2. U(τ
y




















t+1 = T o(U(τ
y
t )).
3. T y =a r gm a x τo
t ∈[0,1]   Z(τ
y
t ,τo
t+1) subject to τo
t+1 = T o(U(τ
y
t ,u t)).
The ﬁrst equilibrium condition requires the decisive voter to choose τo
t to maximize
the utility of the old rich if ut < 1/2 and the utility of the old poor if ut > 1/2. In the
case of an equal number, the old rich are assumed to be decisive. The second equilibrium




t+1, under rational expectations about future taxes and distributions of types.
The third equilibrium condition requires the decisive old voter to choose τ
y
t to maximize
9revenue from the young. Rational voters also understand that their choice over current
redistribution aﬀects future redistribution via the private decision rule and public policy.
3.2 The Determination of To and U
We solve the equilibrium conditions recursively. Condition 1 deﬁnes a one-to-one mapping
from the state variable to the equilibrium choice of taxation of the old: τo
t = T o(ut).
Suppose that the majority are the old rich: ut ≤ 1/2. The objective function of the
majority is given by W o,r =( 1− τo
t )+W(τo




t < 0. This implies that the old rich pay more than they receive because
poor agents pay no tax, but the revenue is distributed equally between the rich and the
poor. Therefore, the old rich prefer τo
t =0 .
Alternatively, suppose that the majority are the old poor: ut > 1/2. The objective
function of the majority is given by W o,p = W(τo




t > 0. Therefore, the old poor prefer τo
t = 1. The mapping that satisﬁes




0i f ut ≤ 1/2,
1i f ut > 1/2.
(7)




















·{ (1 − τ
y
t )+β · (1 − T
o(U(τ
y
t ,u t)))}, (8)
where T o(·) ∈{ 0,1} is given by (7). Because T o(·) ∈{ 0,1}, any solution of (8) must be






























t ,u t) is the proportion of the old poor when τo
t+1 = 1 is expected, and Ur(τ
y
t ,u t)
is the proportion of the old poor when τo
t+1 = 0 is expected.
Under the assumption of rational expectations, any solution to the functional equation









t ,u t)} for τ
y
t ≤ ˆ τy(ut),
Up(τ
y
t ,u t)f o r τ
y
t > ˆ τy(ut),
(9)













The process of deriving the solution (9) is as follows. Suppose that young agents in
period t expect τo
t+1 = 0. With this expectation, educational investments by the rich-
born young and the poor-born young are er∗(τ
y
t ,0) = {1 − τ
y





t + β}/2γ, respectively, and the size of the old poor in period t +1i sut+1 =
Ur(τ
y
t ,u t). By (7), the expectation of τo
t+1 = 0 is rational if ut+1 = Ur(τ
y
t ,u t) ≤ 1/2, that
is, if τ
y
t ≤ ˆ τy(ut). Suppose, instead, that young agents born in period t expect τo
t+1 =1 .
By (7), this expectation is rational if ut+1 = Up(τ
y
t ,u t) > 1/2. The expectation is rational
for any τ
y
t ∈ [0,1] and ut ∈ [0,1] because it always holds that ut+1 = Up(τ
y
t ,u t) >
1/2. Consequently, there are multiple solutions for the range of τ
y
t ≤ ˆ τy(ut)a sl o n ga s
ˆ τy(ut) ≥ 0h o l d s . ˆ τy(ut) ≥ 0h o l d si fμ/γ ≥ 1/(1 + β), or, if μ/γ < 1/(1 + β)a n d
ut ∈ [0,β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ)].4
[Figure 3 about here.]
As depicted in Figure 3, there are multiple, self-fulﬁlling expectations of U for the range
of τ
y
t ∈ [0, ˆ τy(ut)]. Which particular U arises in equilibrium depends on the expectations
of agents. To illustrate U in equilibrium, we follow Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2007) and introduce the critical rate of τ
y
t : θ ∈ [0, ˆ τ
y
t (ut)]. The rate θ, which depends on
the expectations of agents, is the highest tax rate that yields a majority of the old rich.
For τ
y
t >θ , the majority is the old poor. However, for τ
y
t ∈ (0,θ], the majority is either
the rich or the poor.
With the expectation parameter θ, the functional solution is reduced as follows. If
μ/γ < 1/(1 + β)a n dut ∈ (β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ),1], then ˆ τy(ut) < 0 holds. The solution




t ,u t) (Fig. 3(a)). If μ/γ ≥ 1/(1 + β), or if
μ/γ < 1/(1+β)a n dut ∈ [0,β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ)], then ˆ τy(ut) ≥ 0 holds (Fig. 3(b)). The














t ,u t)i f τ
y
t ∈ (θ,1].
4ˆ τy(ut) ≥ 0 is rewritten as ut ≤ β/(1 − μ/γ)(1 + β). This condition of ut holds ∀ut ∈ [0,1] if
β/(1 − μ/γ)(1 + β) ≥ 1, that is, if μ/γ ≥ 1/(1 + β). If μ/γ < 1/(1 + β), then ˆ τy(ut) ≥ 0h o l d sf o r
ut ∈ [0,β/(1 − μ/γ)(1 + β)].
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γ < 1




















3.3 The Determination of Ty and the Characterization of the
Period−t Political Equilibria
Given the characterization of T o and U satisfying equilibrium conditions 1 and 2, respec-
tively, we consider the political determination of τ
y
t that satisﬁes equilibrium condition
3. Because there are two possible cases of a majority, we introduce the correspond-
ing deﬁnition of the political equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium and a rich-majority
equilibrium.W h e n ut > 1/2, there is a poor-majority equilibrium where agents expect
τo
t+1 = 1 and choose τ
y
t to induce a majority of the poor in period t +1 . When ut ≤ 1/2,
there is a rich-majority equilibrium where agents expect τo
t+1 = 0 and choose τ
y
t to induce
a majority of the rich in period t +1 .
The objective of the decisive voter is to choose the τ
y
t that maximizes revenue from
the young Z. Given the state variable ut, maximizing Z is equivalent to maximizing ˜ Z as
presented in (6). Therefore, the objective function of the decisive voter is given by ˜ Z(τ
y
t ,1)
if agents expect τo
t+1 =1 , and is given by ˜ Z(τ
y
t ,0) if agents expect τo
t+1 =0 . These two
objective functions demonstrate Laﬀer curves with the following properties: (i)   Z(τ
y
t ,1) is
a hump-shaped function of τ
y
t ,w i t ham a x i m u ma tτ
y
t =1 /2; (ii)   Z(τ
y
t ,0) is a hump-shaped
function of τ
y
t ,w i t ham a x i m u ma tτ
y
t =( 1+β)/2; (iii)   Z(τ
y






[Figure 4 about here.]
The properties of the objective functions imply that the decisive voter may maximize
revenue from the young by taking the top of the Laﬀer curve   Z(τ
y
t ,0); i.e., by setting
τ
y
t =( 1+β)/2 under the expectation of τo
t+1 = 0. However, this choice is inconsistent
with the second equilibrium condition because the choice of τ
y
t is limited to the range of
(0,θ]w h e r eθ ≤ ˆ τy(ut) < (1 + β)/2. By contrast, the decisive voter can take the top of
the other Laﬀer curve   Z(τ
y
t ,1) by setting τ
y
t =1 /2 under the expectation that τo
t+1 =1i s
consistent with the second equilibrium condition. Therefore, the revenue from the young
is maximized by setting τ
y
t = θ under the expectation of τo
t+1 = 0, or by setting τ
y
t =1 /2
under the expectation of τo
t+1 = 1. The former choice produces a higher level of revenue
12than the latter if and only if   Z(θ,0) ≥   Z(1/2,1); that is, if and only if θ ≥   θ,w h e r e :
  θ(β)=





Given ut and   θ(β), we obtain the following characterization of the period-t political
equilibria.
Proposition 1
(i) For any ut ∈ [0,1], there exists a set of poor-majority equilibria such that ∀t, T o is
given by (7), U(τ
y
t ,u t) is given by (10), and T y =1 /2. The equilibrium outcome is
unique and such that ∀t, τ
y
t =1 /2, τo
t+1 =1 ,a n dut+1 =1 −((1 − ut)+( μ/γ) · ut)/4.
(ii) Suppose that β ≥ 1/4 and ut ∈ [0, ˆ u] hold where:
ˆ u ≡
  








There exists a set of rich-majority equilibria such that ∀t, T o is given by (7),
U(τ
y
t ,u t) is given by (10), and T y = θ ∈ [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)]. The equilibrium outcome
is indeterminate such that ∀t, τ
y
t = θ ∈ [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)], τo
t+1 =0 ,a n dut+1 =1−
{(1 − ut)+( μ/γ) · ut}(1 − θ + β)/2.
Proof. See the appendix.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 indicates the set of (β,ut) satisfying the condition given in Proposition 1.
When the size of poor-born agents is large such that ut > ˆ u (see the area P.1(i)), a
unique poor-majority equilibrium exists. Although the poor-born agents have the chance
of becoming rich via educational investment, the rich can never become a majority in
period t because the number of poor-born agents is large. Therefore, when ut > ˆ u holds,
voting that induces a future majority of the poor is the only option. The economy then
features a unique equilibrium with a poor majority who prefer 100% taxation on the old.
The young are taxed at the top of the Laﬀer curve, conditional on the expectation of
100% taxation when old.
When the size of poor-born agents is small, such that ut ≤ ˆ u (see the area P.1(i)&(ii)),
there is still an option that induces a future majority of the poor. However, there is an
alternative option that induces a future majority of the rich by setting τ
y
t = θ.T h e
equilibrium realized depends on the expectation of agents. The rich-majority equilibrium
13is sustained as an equilibrium if Z(θ,0) ≥ Z(1//2,1); that is, if the expectation parameter
θ is above the critical level   θ(β). Given that the upper bound of θ is ˆ τy(ut), there exists a
rich-majority equilibrium if θ is set within the range [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)]. This set is nonempty
if and only if ut ≤ ˆ u,w h e r eˆ u is nonnegative if and only if β ≥ 1/4.
As illustrated in Figure 5, the condition given in Proposition 1(ii) requires a high β
and a low ut.Ah i g hβ implies that agents attach a high weight to their utility in their
old age, thereby having a strong incentive to invest in education. This results in a large
number of the old who have been successful in their youth. A low ut indicates a large
number of rich-born young agents, thereby implying a large number of future rich agents.
Given these two factors, the economy can attain a rich-majority equilibrium when agents
expect no taxation on the old.
4 Dynamic Political Equilibrium
This section investigates the motion of the distribution of rich and poor over time. The
deﬁnition of the dynamic political equilibrium is as follows.
Deﬁnition 2: A dynamic political equilibrium is a sequence of ut with the initial con-
dition u0 such that (i) (τ
y
t ,τo
t+1) constitutes the period-t political equilibrium; and



















Based on the characterization of the period-t political equilibrium in Proposition 1, a
sequence of ut is characterized by:
ut+1 =
 
{Up (1/2,u t),Ur(θ,ut)} if β ≥ 1/4a n dut ≤ ˆ u,
























(1 − θ + β).




t+1)=( 1 /2,1) and (θ,0). The economy attains a poor-majority equilibrium
with τ
y
t =1 /2a n dut+1 = Up (1/2,u t) > 1/2 when agents expect τo
t+1 =1 ,a n da
rich-majority equilibrium with τ
y
t = θ and ut+1 = Ur(θ,ut) ≤ 1/2 when agents expect
τo
t+1 = 0. Suppose, instead, that β ≥ 1/4o rut ≤ ˆ u fails to hold. There is a unique
period-t equilibrium with (τ
y
t ,τo
t+1)=( 1 /2,1), and ut+1 is uniquely given by Up (1/2,u t).
For precise consideration of the dynamic motion of ut, we illustrate (11) in a ut −




























∀ut ∈ [0,1], (12)
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Based on these properties, we can illustrate the dynamic path of ut given by (11) as in
Figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here.]
In what follows, we focus on a steady-state equilibrium where the sequence of ut is
stationary over time, and we show that there are multiple steady-state equilibria under
a certain condition. The steady-state equilibria are illustrated by the crossing points of
the 45-degree line and ut+1 = {Up (1/2,u t),Ur(θ,ut)}.W ed e n o t eb y¯ up the steady-state
level of the old poor in a poor-majority equilibrium, and we denote by ¯ ur the steady-
state level of the old poor in a rich-majority equilibrium. By deﬁnition, ¯ up and ¯ ur satisfy









































Within the range of θ ∈ [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)], ¯ ur(θ) attains a minimum at θ =   θ(β)a n da
maximum at θ =ˆ τy(ut) because ¯ ur(θ)i si n c r e a s i n gi nθ. Direct calculation leads to





The following proposition establishes the condition for the existence and stability of
the steady-state equilibria.
Proposition 2
(i) Suppose that β<1/4 holds, or that β ≥ 1/4 and ˆ u<1/2 hold. There exists a
unique, globally stable poor-majority steady-state equilibrium.
15(ii) Suppose that β ≥ 1/4 and ˆ u ≥ 1/2 hold. There exist multiple steady-state equilibria.
(a) The equilibrium path is determinate and converges to the poor-majority steady-
state equilibrium if ˆ u ∈ [1/2, ¯ up) and u0 ∈ (ˆ u,1]; it is indeterminate otherwise.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Figure 6.
The properties of the steady-state equilibria depend on the parameter values and
the expectations of agents as illustrated in Figure 6. Panels (a) and (b) demonstrate
a unique, stable poor-majority steady-state equilibrium. The majority is always poor
along the equilibrium path in panel (a). By contrast, in panel (b), the majority could
be rich along the transition path but ﬁnally converge to the poor-majority steady-state
equilibrium.
Panels (c) and (d) demonstrate the multiple steady-state equilibria. Panel (c) indi-
cates that given u0 > ˆ u, the equilibrium path deﬁnitely converges to the poor-majority
steady-state equilibrium. However, when u0 ≤ ˆ u, the equilibrium is indeterminate: the
economy might attain the rich-majority steady-state equilibrium depending on the expec-
tations of agents. By contrast, panel (d) illustrates a situation where the equilibrium is
indeterminate for all initial condition of u. An economy that stays in the poor-majority
steady state might move to the rich-majority steady state because of changes in the ex-
pectations of agents. Moreover, the changes in the expectations of agents could produce
electoral cycles that move back and forth between the two equilibria as illustrated in
panel (d) of Figure 6. These expectations play a key role in the dynamic motion of the
equilibrium path.
Figure 7 illustrates the set of parameters (μ/γ,β) classiﬁed according to the charac-
terization of the steady states. As illustrated in Figure 7, given (μ/γ), a high β is required
for the existence of the rich-majority steady state. This is because a high β implies that
agents place large weight on their future income, thereby giving young agents an incen-
tive to invest in education, and the successful (rich) agents then form a majority. On the
other hand, given the discount factor, a high (μ/γ) is required for the existence of the
rich-majority steady state. A high (μ/γ) implies that the poor-born young agents have
many opportunities for education and that education costs are low. Therefore, young
agents have a strong incentive to invest in education, and this results in a majority of rich
agents.
[Figure 7 about here.]
5 Comparative Statics Analysis
We have characterized the political equilibria and qualitatively assessed the impacts of γ
and μ on the determination of tax rates and the size of the poor. To facilitate understand-
16ing, this section undertakes numerical analysis by focusing on the relative magnitude of
the two parameters μ and γ,( μ/γ), that represent accessibility of education for poor-born
agents. We examine how accessibility (μ/γ) aﬀects intergenerational mobility, income in-
equality, and the size of redistribution in the steady states.
For the purposes of this analysis, we assume a generation to be 20 years. This is
shorter than the usual assumption of, say, 30 years. We adopt a shorter generation length
because the current model assumes that agents work in both periods of life. The ﬁrst
and second periods correspond to ages 25–44 and 45–64 years, respectively. We assume a
single-period discount rate given by 0.96. Because agents under the current assumption
plan over generations that span 20 years, we discount the future by (0.96)20.
We ﬁrst examine how accessibility of education, (μ/γ), aﬀects the pattern of political
equilibria. In the current environment, there is a threshold level of (μ/γ)g i v e nb y0 .6123,
as illustrated in Figure 8. For a low value of (μ/γ) such that (μ/γ) ∈ [0,0.6123], there is
a unique poor-majority steady state with 50% taxation on the young and 100% taxation
on the old. A low value of (μ/γ)m e a n sal o wμ and/or a high γ, evidencing the diﬃculty
that poor-born agents have in obtaining education. Because of this, the majority is always
the poor, who support 100% taxation on the old. By contrast, for a high value of (μ/γ)
such that (μ/γ) ∈ (0.6123,1], there are multiple steady-state equilibria, comprising the
poor-majority equilibrium above and a rich-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the
old. In the rich-majority equilibrium, the young and the old both have a lower tax burden
than in the poor-majority equilibrium.
[Figure 8 about here.]
In what follows, we demonstrate some numerical results for intergenerational mobility,
income inequality, and the size of redistribution and consider how these variables are
aﬀected by the size of (μ/γ).
5.1 Intergenerational Mobility
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respectively. In the steady state, the distribution of rich and poor becomes stationary
over time. The upward and downward mobility levels are equal in the steady state:
17Mup = Mdown.W ed e n o t eb y ¯ Mp and ¯ Mr the levels of intergenerational mobility in the




p · μ · e
p∗(1/2,1) = (1 − u




r · μ · e
p∗(θ,0) = (1 − u
r) · (1 − e
r∗(θ,0)).
Figure 9 illustrates the numerical result.
[Figure 9 about here.]

















,θ ∈ [˜ θ(β), ˆ τ
y(¯ u
r)].
These equations indicate that ¯ Mp and ¯ Mr(θ) are increasing in μ and decreasing in γ.F o r
poor-born agents, a higher μ yields greater opportunities for going on to education, while
al o w e rγ provides lower costs of receiving education. In turn, these eﬀects increase the
number of poor-born agents who can become rich via education. Therefore, an increase
in (μ/γ) enhances intergenerational mobility, as depicted in Figure 9.
Figure 9 demonstrates that for the case of (μ/γ) ∈ (0.6123,1] featuring multiple





p∗(θ,0) > ¯ M
p =¯ u
pμe
p∗(1/2,1) ∀θ ∈ [0, ˆ τ
y
t (ut)].
To understand this relation, we focus on the two factors that determine mobility: the
size of the poor and the probability of success for poor-born agents. The size of the poor
is less than half in the rich-majority equilibrium, while it is more than half in the poor-
majority equilibrium: ¯ ur(θ) ≤ 1/2 < ¯ up. The probability of success for poor-born agents
is also higher in the rich-majority equilibrium than in the poor-majority equilibrium:
ep∗(θ,0) >e p∗(1/2,1). Therefore, two competing eﬀects determine the relative size of
¯ Mr(θ)a n d ¯ Mp. Figure 9 shows that the eﬀect via the probability of success is greater
than the eﬀect via the size of the poor, thereby resulting in ¯ Mr(θ) > ¯ Mp.
185.2 Income Inequality
We use the Gini coeﬃcient as a measure of inequality in our framework. In particular,
we focus on the income inequality among young agents rather than among young and old
agents for the following reasons. First, income inequality among young agents provides
a qualitatively similar result to that among young and old agents because the status of
each agent persists over the life cycle. Second, focusing on the inequality among young
agents enables us intuitively and graphically to illustrate the numerical result.
We calculate the Gini coeﬃcient among young agents in terms of after-tax-and-transfer
income. In each period, there are two types of young agents: young rich agents with per
capita income given by (1−τ
y
t )+st, and young poor agents with per capita income given
by st. Panel (a) of Figure 10 summarizes information about per capita income, the size
of the population and the total income for each type of young agent. Panel (b) of Figure
10 illustrates a Lorenz curve. The Gini coeﬃcient among young agents is calculated by
A/(A + B)i np a n e l( b )w h e r eA is the shaded area and B is the unshaded area.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Panel (b) shows that two factors determine the Gini coeﬃcient: (i) the ratio of the
rich to the poor denoted by the population ratio (PR), and (ii) the ratio of the per capita
income of the rich to the per capita income of the poor, denoted by the income ratio
(IR). The role of the ﬁrst factor is intuitive: given the IR factor eﬀect, a lower PR (i.e., a
smaller number of the rich) results in the larger size of the area A and thus a higher Gini


















Per capita income of the young rich








Given the PR factor eﬀect, a higher IR implies a higher ratio of (Slope (B)/Slope (A)),
a larger size of the area A, and thus a higher Gini coeﬃcient.
[Figure 11 about here.]
These factors can be used to explain the following predictions of the numerical result
depicted in Figure 11. First, in the poor-majority equilibrium, a higher (μ/γ)r e s u l t si n
19a lower level of inequality. An increase in (μ/γ) leads to a larger proportion of the rich,
thereby creating a positive PR eﬀect on equality. In addition, a larger proportion of the
rich yields a larger share of taxpayers, thereby resulting in a greater redistribution that
creates a positive IR eﬀect on equality. Because of these positive eﬀects on equality, a
higher (μ/γ) leads to a lower Gini coeﬃcient in the poor-majority equilibrium.
Second, when we compare the rich- and poor-majority equilibria, the rich-majority
equilibrium attains a higher or a lower level of inequality depending on the relative size
of the PR and IR eﬀects. The rich-majority equilibrium attains a larger proportion of
the rich, which produces a positive PR eﬀect on equality. However, the rich-majority
equilibrium realizes lower tax rates on the young and old, both of which result in lesser
redistribution and thus a negative IR eﬀect on equality.
For the case of (μ/γ) ∈ (0.6123,1] featured by multiple equilibria, the positive PR
eﬀect is outweighed by the negative IR eﬀect, as the rich-majority equilibrium attains
a higher Gini coeﬃcient than the poor-majority equilibrium. However, when the rich-
majority equilibrium with a high (μ/γ)( f o re x a m p l e ,μ/γ =0 .9) is compared with the
poor-majority equilibrium with a low (μ/γ)( f o re x a m p l e ,μ/γ =0 .1), the positive PR
eﬀect overrides the negative IR eﬀect, as the rich-majority equilibrium attains a lower Gini
coeﬃcient than the poor-majority equilibrium. Therefore, the accessibility of education,
represented by (μ/γ), plays a key role in determining the relative degree of inequality
between the rich-majority and poor-majority equilibria.
5.3 The Size of Redistribution
We use the size of transfer, s, rather than the tax rates, as a measure of redistribution
for the following reason. In the political economy literature, the skewness of income
distribution aﬀects the political determination of tax rates, and tax rates and the number
of the rich (i.e., the tax base) determine the size of transfer. In the current framework, the
eﬀect of the skewness of tax rates is abstracted except at the threshold level of u =1 /2.
That is, the political determination of the tax rate on the old is featured by a binary choice
of τo ∈{ 0,1} because of simple majority voting by the rich and the poor in the absence
of tax distortion. Given the binary choice and the resulting lack of a skewness eﬀect,
it is not appropriate to focus on tax rates when we compare cross-country diﬀerence
of redistribution. Therefore, we instead focus on the size of transfers as a measure of
redistribution.
We denote by ¯ sp and ¯ sr the size of transfers in the poor-majority steady state and in
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r)e
r∗ (θ,0) + ¯ u
rμe
p∗ (θ,0)}·θ.
These equations indicate that two factors determine the size of transfer: the tax rates and
the number of the rich (i.e., the tax base). Figure 12 illustrates the numerical result.
[Figure 12 about here.]
We ﬁnd the following three observations from Figure 12. First, in the poor-majority
equilibrium, a higher (μ/γ) results in a larger size of transfer. An increase in (μ/γ)l e a d s
to a larger proportion of successful, rich agents, thereby creating a positive tax base eﬀect
on the size of transfer. Second, for the case of (μ/γ) ∈ (0.6123,1] featured by multiple
equilibria, the poor-majority equilibrium attains a larger size of transfer than the rich-
majority equilibrium because the former is characterized by higher tax rates.
Third, when the rich-majority equilibrium with a high (μ/γ)( f o re x a m p l e ,μ/γ =0 .9)
is compared with the poor-majority equilibrium with a low (μ/γ)( f o re x a m p l e ,μ/γ =
0.1), the rich-majority equilibrium attains a larger size of transfer than the poor-majority
equilibrium because of a larger tax base eﬀect. Therefore, the accessibility of education
aﬀects the relative size of transfer between the rich-majority and poor-majority equilibria.
6 Empirical Implications of Mobility and Inequality
The numerical analysis in Section 5 shows that intergenerational mobility and inequality
depend on the parameter (μ/γ) representing the accessibility of education for poor-born
agents. In this subsection, we focus on (μ/γ) and investigate the empirical implications of
the model by comparing the model predictions in Figures 9, 11 and 12 with the empirical
evidence (Subsection 6.1). We then provide some empirical evidence on the cross-country
diﬀerences of educational accessibility that supports our interpretation of the numerical
result (Subsection 6.2).
6.1 Interpretation of the Numerical Result
The numerical results in Figures 9 and 11 show that where the poor-majority equilib-
rium is concerned, the political economy tends to generate a negative correlation between
21inequality and mobility, as shown in previous work (Maoz and Moav, 1999; Owen and
Weil, 1998; Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira, 2007; Mookherjee and Napel, 2007). This
prediction also ﬁts some empirical data in Figure 1. Here, Italy, the United Kingdom
and the United States feature high inequality and low mobility, while the Nordic coun-
tries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway) feature low inequality and high mobility.
Therefore, the substantial diﬀerence in inequality and mobility among those countries are
produced by diﬀerences in the accessibility of education.
The negative correlation between inequality and mobility, however, appears less than
exact (Solon, 2002). Despite considerable intergenerational mobility in Australia (D’Addio,
2007) and Canada (Corak, 2006), these countries also score relatively highly on measures
of cross-sectional inequality (see Figure 1). One possible explanation is that they are
represented by a rich-majority equilibrium with a certain level of μ/γ(≥ 0.6123). To
understand this argument, let us compare the poor-majority equilibrium with μ/γ =0 .9
(representing the Nordic countries) and the rich-majority equilibrium with μ/γ =0 .7 (rep-
resenting Australia and Canada). Both these equilibria obtain similar levels of mobility:
the diﬀerence in mobility rates is less than 2% (see Figure 9). However, the rich-majority
equilibrium with μ/γ =0 .9 attains a much higher Gini coeﬃcient than the poor-majority
equilibrium with μ/γ =0 .7, the diﬀerence being more than 10% (see Figure 11). These
properties, the similarity in mobility rates and the substantial diﬀerence in inequality
between two groups of countries, are produced by multiple, self-fulﬁlling expectations of
agents.
The above-mentioned classiﬁcation of countries also ﬁts the empirical evidence on
the size of redistribution. When the poor majority is considered, a country with higher
accessibility of education (such as the Nordic countries) shows a larger size of redistribu-
tion compared with one with lower accessibility of education (such as Italy, the United
Kingdom and the United States) because of the tax base eﬀect. When the focus is on
the rich-majority equilibrium representing Australia and Canada, the equilibrium shows
a smaller size of redistribution compared with the poor-majority equilibrium with high
accessibility (such as the Nordic countries) because of lower tax rates, but shows a larger
size of redistribution compared with the poor-majority equilibrium with low accessibility
(such as Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States) because of the tax base eﬀect.
This model prediction of the size of redistribution ﬁts in well with the empirical evidence
on the size of redistribution reported by OECD (2008b).
226.2 Evidence on the Cross-country Diﬀerence of Educational
Accessibility
Our interpretation of the numerical result depends on the assumption that Australia,
Canada and Nordic countries have higher accessibility of education (i.e., a higher μ/γ)
than Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. We here present some empirical
evidence that supports this assumption.
Based on the two international student achievement tests, the Third International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and its replication for a partly diﬀerent set of
countries (TIMSS-repeat), Sch¨ utz, Ursprung and W¨ oßmann (2008) report that England,
Scotland and the United States are included in the top 10 countries with the least equality
of educational opportunity among the sample of 29 OECD countries, whereas Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, and Sweden are ranked lower than eleventh.
This empirical result indicates that the United Kingdom and the United States provide
less equality of educational opportunity than other countries. OECD (2008a) supports this
evidence using the data from the OECD program for International Student Assessment
(PISA) 2000 survey. Finland provides more equitable access to higher education than
the United Kingdom among 10 countries including Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
We should note that equality and mobility are low in Italy, despite fairly equitable
access to education, a fact less easy to explain with our model. However, some empirical
studies suggest a strong regional variation in educational accessibility in Italy, which
might result in low equality and mobility. For example, Checchi and his collaborators
show that the southern area in Italy presents a stronger eﬀect of the family background
on the test scores of high school students (Checchi and Peragine, 2005; Checchi, Fiorio,
Leonardi, 2007) and a higher inequality of educational opportunity (Checchi and Peragine,
2009) compared with the northern area. Therefore, this regional variation in educational
accessibility, which is not captured by Sch¨ utz, Ursprung and W¨ oßmann (2008) and OECD
(2008a), could be a possible explanation for low equality and mobility in Italy.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a politico-economic model that analyzes the mutual link between in-
come inequality and intergenerational mobility within and across generations. The focus
of this paper is the correlation between inequality and mobility. Empirical studies have
shown that this correlation across countries is negative for most of the OECD, but it
does not ﬁt Australia and Canada, as these counties feature both high mobility and high
inequality. The current analysis demonstrates two key factors that explain the empiri-
23cal evidence: the accessibility of education that provides a negative correlation between
inequality and mobility, and the multiple, self-fulﬁlling expectations that produce an equi-
librium characterized by both high inequality and high mobility. Our model can also be
used to demonstrate the dynamic motion of inequality and mobility within each coun-
try. Under the condition that the economy attains multiple political equilibria, we show
that two economies sharing the same initial conditions can converge to diﬀerent equilibria
depending on the expectations of agents, and that without any structural change, the
economy at one of the equilibria may move to the other with a change in the expectations
of agents. The expectations of agents then play a key role in the determination of the
long-run state of the economy.
To obtain these results, we simplify the analysis by adopting a simple linear, risk-
neutral utility function. We do not consider an alternative utility function; for example
a concave, risk-averse utility function. In addition, we focus on income inequality among
young agents, rather than income inequality among young and old agents. Furthermore,
the parameters γ and μ representing educational accessibility for poor-born individuals
are exogenously given and thus reﬂect no political decisions. However, we believe that the
present analysis provides a suitable framework for understanding cross-country diﬀerences
in inequality and mobility as well as changes in inequality and mobility over time as
aﬀected by redistributive politics and the self-fulﬁlling expectations of agents.
24Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Suppose that at time t, agents know that τ
y
t =1 /2 and expect that τo
t+1 =1 . W e
obtain:




































where the inequality in the third line comes from μ ∈ [0,1] and γ>1. By (7), ut+1 > 1/2
implies that τo
t+1 = 1, fulﬁlling initial expectations. Therefore, a poor-majority equilib-
rium exists if the decisive voter ﬁnds it optimal to set τ
y
t =1 /2.
Suppose that γ/μ > 1+β and ut ∈ (β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ),1] hold. The condition (10)
implies that the rational expectation is uniquely given by τo
t+1 =1f o rτ
y
t ∈ [0,1]. The
revenue from the young Z(τ
y
t ,1) is maximized by setting τ
y
t =1 /2. Suppose, instead,
that γ/μ ≤ 1+β holds or that γ/μ > 1+β and ut ∈ [0,β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ)] hold. The





t =1 /2 is optimal if Z(1/2,1) >Z (θ,0); that is, if θ ∈ [0, ˜ θ).
(ii) Suppose that agents know that τ
y
t = θ ≤ ˆ τy(ut) and expect τo
t+1 = 0. Then:
ut+1 =( 1− ut) · (1 − e
r∗ (θ,0)) + ut ·{ μ · (1 − e








































where the inequality in the third line comes from θ ≤ ˆ τy(ut). By (7), this implies that
τo
t+1 = 0, fulﬁlling initial expectations. Therefore, a rich-majority equilibrium exists if the
decisive voter ﬁnds it optimal to set τ
y
t = θ ∈ [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)].
The condition (10) implies that the expectation of τo
t+1 = 0 can be rational if (i)
γ/μ ≤ 1+β, or (ii) γ/μ > 1+β and ut ∈ [0,β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ)]. For each case, setting
τ
y
t = θ is optimal if and only if Z(θ,0) ≥ Z(1/2,1); that is, θ ∈ [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)]. The
set [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)] is nonempty if and only if ut ∈ [0, ˆ u], where ˆ u<β / (1 + β)(1 − μ/γ)
25always holds and ˆ u ≥ 0 ⇔ β ≥ 1/4. Therefore, given θ ∈ [  θ(β), ˆ τy(ut)], there exists a
rich-majority equilibrium if β ≥ 1/4a n dut ∈ [0, ˆ u].

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States). All data except for Japan are from OECD (2006). The Gini coeﬃcient and the
intergenerational earnings elasticity of Japan are from OECD (2005) and Lefranc, Ojima
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Figure 3: The equilibrium decision rule ut+1 = U(τ
y
t ). The solid lines are graphs of
U satisfying equilibrium condition 2. Panel (a) illustrates the case of γ/μ > 1+β
and ut ∈ (β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ),1]; panel (b) illustrates the case of γ/μ > 1+β and
ut ∈ [0,β/(1 + β)(1 − μ/γ)], or the case of γ/μ ≤ 1+β.
32Figure 4: The graph of   Z under the set of parameters provided in Proposition 1. Panel




Figure 5: The set of (β,ut) classiﬁed according to the characterization of period-t political
equilibria.
34Figure 6: The characterization of dynamic political equilibria. Panel (a) illustrates the
case of β<1/4; panel (b) illustrates the case of β ≥ 1/4a n dˆ u<1/2; panel (c)
illustrates the case of β ≥ 1/4a n dˆ u ∈ [1/2, ¯ up); panel (d) illustrates the case of β ≥ 1/4
and ˆ u ∈ [¯ up,1].
35Figure 7: The set of parameters (μ/γ,β) classiﬁed according to the characterization of
the steady states.
36Figure 8: The tax rate on the young (panel (a)) and the tax rate on the old (panel (b)).
37Figure 9: Intergenerational mobility in the steady state.
38Figure 10: Information about per capita income, the size of the population and total
income for each type of young agent (panel (a)) and the Lorenz curve (panel (b)).
39Figure 11: Gini coeﬃcients among young agents.
40Figure 12: Size of transfer in the steady state.
41